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Abstract
Null hypothesis significance testing remains popular despite decades of concern about
misuse and misinterpretation. We believe that much of the problem is due to language:
significance testing has little to do with other meanings of the word “significance”.
Despite the limitations of null-hypothesis tests, we argue here that they remain useful in
many contexts as a guide to whether a certain effect can be seen clearly in that context
(e.g. whether we can clearly see that a correlation or between-group difference is
positive or negative). We therefore suggest that researchers describe the conclusions of
null-hypothesis tests in terms of statistical “clarity” rather than statistical “significance”.
This simple semantic change could substantially enhance clarity in statistical
communication.
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Introduction
Statisticians and scientists have bemoaned the shortcomings of null hypothesis
significance testing (NHST) for nearly a century (Cohen, 1994). Books and articles
proposing the de-emphasis or abandonment of the p-value have been cited thousands of
times (Cohen, 1994, Goodman, 1999, Wilkinson, 1999, Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008,
Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016). These works plead for a focus on effect sizes and
confidence intervals, and point out that null effects that truly have zero magnitude are
unrealistic or impossible in most fields outside of the hard physical sciences (Meehl,
1990, Tukey, 1991, Cohen, 1994). Yet, p-values without confidence intervals (or even
effect sizes) and references to null effects still pervade the scientific literature at all levels
up to and including articles in high-impact journals.
In a meta-analysis of 356 studies Bernardi et al. (2017) found that 72% of studies
contained an ambiguous use of the term “significant”, 49% interpreted non-significant
effects as zero effects, and 44% failed to report a comprehensible effect size. The misuse
and misinterpretation of NHST is so frequent that there have been recent calls for
drastically reducing (Szucs and Ioannidis, 2017) or abandoning (McShane et al., 2017) its
use. Other prescriptions have included the complete abandonment of frequentist
statistics (The, 2011), or the use of a stricter significance threshold (e.g. p < 0.005:
Benjamin et al. (2018)); however, the former seems impractical, while the latter is
unlikely to reduce the misuse and misinterpretation of p-values, or the publication bias
imposed by any p-value threshold (Ridley et al., 2007).
Here, we argue that NHST remains useful, and that pervasive misuse can be reduced
through a linguistic change: using the language of statistical “clarity” instead of
statistical “significance”.
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The null hypothesis is false
In most biological studies, the null hypothesis is known or believed to not be strictly
true. Even in cases where the null hypothesis is sensible (e.g., particle physics, Staley
(2017)), NHST does not provide evidence that a difference is exactly zero. This being the
case, it is worth asking how NHST has survived “if it is as idiotic as . . . long believed”
Ziliak and McCloskey (2008, cited in Kra¨mer (2011)).
The value of NHST can be seen in something like a permutation-based t-test (Good,
2000, Chapter 1): it provides a simple, robust framework to ask whether we can tell
whichmean is bigger. More generally, testing the null hypothesis is a proxy for asking
whether we clearly see a signal of how our data differs from it. In many cases, this comes
down simply to whether we can be confident of the sign of a difference or a correlation
coefficient (Robinson and Wainer, 2001). In other cases (e.g., a one-way ANOVA), it may
not be simple to describe the difference, but NHST is still a reasonable, accepted way to
evaluate whether an effect has been seen clearly.
The “idiocy”, if any, comes in the interpretive step. A statistical fact (“we have seen a
difference between the groups”, which should immediately prompt the question “what
have you learned about that difference?”) is interpreted as a scientific fact (“there is a
‘significant’ difference between the groups), which is often seen as an end in itself: “we
showed that the groups differ”.
The p-value is a property of the study
We often see sentences like, “X et al. showed that there is no significant effect of Y on Z”
with the implication that this effect can now be assumed to be absent (or unimportant).
In fact, the sentence is erroneous even before we get to the implication: significance tests
provide information about a data set – that is, about a study, not about the study system
(Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). Indeed, a very small effect can lead to p < 0.05, when data is
abundant (or noise is small); or a very large one can lead to p > 0.05 when the sample is
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small or noisy.
The statement “X et al. showed that Y has a statistically significant effect on Z” is
similarly misleading. Frequentist statistics effectively assume that the effect is present
(or at least, admit that it can’t be disproven). The question is whether it is seen in a
particular data set. The statement “X et al. were able to see the effect of Y on Z” is not
only more accurate, but it appropriately implies that something is missing: What effect
did they see?
Statistical clarity
The language of “statistical clarity” could help researchers escape various logical traps
while interpreting the results of NHST, allowing for the continued use of NHST as a
simple, robust method of evaluating whether a data signal is clear (see Abelson (1997)
for arguments for NHST). The use of “significance” to describe the results of hypothesis
tests is deeply, and sometimes subtly, misleading, because it is at odds with other
meanings of the word: the p-value is not an accurate gauge of whether a result is large in
magnitude, biologically important, or relevant. “Clarity,” on the other hand, is an apt
term for what NHST actually evaluates. Jones and Tukey (2000) and
Robinson and Wainer (2001) suggest that researchers should report p > 0.05 using
language such as “the direction of the differences among the treatments was
undetermined”. This is a step in the right direction. Replacing “significance” with
“clarity” takes this idea further, and has the promise to substantially improve statistical
communication.
For example, the sentence “X et al. showed that the effect of Y on Z is statistically
unclear”, is noticeably awkward. It seems less like a statement about the study system,
and suggests the more straightforward “did not find a statistically clear effect.” Similarly,
“We did not find a clear difference in response between the control and sham groups” is
both more colloquial and harder to transform into a misleading statement than “We did
not find a significant difference . . . ”. Bernardi et al. (2017) complained that
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“. . . sociological and social significance are sacrificed on the altar of statistical
significance”. Describing statistical tests in terms of clarity would allow “significant” to
reclaim its common English definition and reduce conflation between statistical results
and substantive significance.
Descriptions of statistical results using the language of clarity should begin with
reference to the effect. For example, “The difference between the control and treatment
group was not statistically clear.” Table 1 shows published examples of statements that
misinterpret p-values in three different ways and demonstrates how to rephrase them in
the language of clarity.
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.Language from published articles Rewritten using “clarity”
Accepting the null hypothesis (p > 0.05 ; no effect)
Toxins accumulate after acute expo-
sure but have no effect on behaviour
Toxins accumulate after acute expo-
sure but their effects on behaviour are
statistically unclear
There was no effect of elevated carbon
dioxide on reproductive behaviors
The effect of elevated carbon dioxide
on reproductive behaviors was statis-
tically unclear
The finding that species richness
showed no significant relationship
with the area of available habitat is
surprising because richness is usually
strongly influenced by landscape con-
text
Although species richness is usually
strongly influenced by landscape con-
text, we were unable to find a statisti-
cally clear relationship in this study
Inferring weak effects from large p-values (Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016)
. . . differences between treatment and
control groups were nonsignificant,
with P values of at least 0.3, and most
in the range 0.7 ≤ P ≤ 0.9.
. . . differences between treatment and
control groups were not statistically
clear (all P > 0.05) [confidence intervals
would also be valuable here!]
The difference between “clear” and “not clear” is not clear (Gelman and Stern, 2006)
This correlation was significant in
males (ρ = 0.35, P <0.05) but not fe-
males (ρ = 0.35, NS). . . . [The authors
later write as though they have demon-
strated a difference between males and fe-
males]
Although males and females show
the same correlation coefficient (ρ =
0.35), the sign of the coefficient is sta-
tistically clear only in males . . . [This
phrasing may suggest to the authors that
confidence intervals are called for.]
. . . risk of low BMD [bone mineral
density] remained greater in HCV-
coinfected women versus women
with HIV alone (adjusted OR 2.99,
95% CI 1.33–6.74), but no association
was found between HCV coinfection
and low BMD in men (adjusted OR
1.26, 95% CI 0.75–2.10). . . . The pre-
cise mechanisms for the association
between viral hepatitis and low BMD
in HIV-infected women but not men
remain unclear.
. . . risk of low BMD [bone mineral
density] remained greater in HCV-
coinfected women versus women
with HIV alone (adjusted OR 2.99,
95% CI 1.33–6.74), but the association
between HCV coinfection and low
BMD inmenwas not statistically clear
(adjusted OR 1.26, 95% CI 0.75–2.10).
. . . Pursuing biological differences be-
tween women and men in the effect
of HIV on BMD would be premature
given these results.
Table 1. Examples of misleading language in peer-reviewed papers (citations available
by request), and revisions using our proposed language of clarity.
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Conclusions
We believe that NHST is useful as a simple, robust way to ask whether an effect can be
seen clearly in a particular data set (Robinson and Wainer, 2001), and that careful,
clarity-based language can reduce misinterpretation and miscommunication.
We agree with Cohen (1994) and others (Goodman, 1999, Ziliak and McCloskey, 2008,
Wasserstein and Lazar, 2016), that scientific communication and understanding will be
improved by a shift away from p-values to effect sizes and confidence intervals. We
argue that the use of “statistical clarity” reinforces the need for confidence intervals and
effect sizes by making it clearer that bald statements about p-values are insufficient. The
statement “The difference between our control and treatment groups was not
statistically clear (p = 0.30)” is noticeably incomplete; an effect size and confidence
interval are required to complete the story.
Improving language will not by itself solve all of the known problems with current
statistical practice. We echo previous statements in favor of “neglected factors” (prior
and related evidence, plausibility of mechanism, study design and data quality, real
world benefits, novelty and other factors) (McShane et al., 2017) and reporting of a priori
analysis of statistical power to avoid emphasis on implausibly large effects given low
statistical power (the “winner’s curse” Gelman and Carlin, 2014, Szucs and Ioannidis,
2017, Bernardi et al., 2017). Additionally, we support the idea of writing a statistical
journal that chronicles all steps in the analytical process (Kass et al., 2016), and clearly
delineating the boundary between inferences based on a priori hypotheses and
discoveries from post hoc data exploration.
Whether or not our recommendations are broadly adopted by authors, reviewers, and
editors, they can be useful for individual researchers who want to help themselves think
clearly about NHST results. We have found that rephrasing NHST statements that we
encounter (in the literature, or in seminar presentations) in terms of clarity has already
helped us with both interpretation and communication.
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